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MOTA CASE NOTE (ONLINE)

CASE NOTE

WHAT IS PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER? THE SUPREME COURT
DISMISSED LABCORP V. METABOLITE
LABORATORIES, BUT THE ISSUE IS NOT
GOING AWAY
SUE ANN MOTA*
INTRODUCTION
Patent law seeks to strike a balance regarding patentable subject
matter between overprotection, which can impede the free exchange of
1
ideas, and underprotection, which can lessen the incentive to invent.
Thus, what actually constitutes patentable subject matter under the
2
Patent Act is an important question and a question that the U.S.
Supreme Court avoided in June 2006 by dismissing Laboratory Corp. of
3
America Holdings (LabCorp) v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
Section 101 of the Patent Act regarding patentable subject matter
was not argued in the court below so the Court did not decide LabCorp
4
on the patentable subject matter issue. Future litigants, however, will
not likely neglect to argue this so the Court will no doubt face this issue
again. This article will examine the LabCorp case and the issue of
patentable subject matter, concluding with recommendations for when
the issue is raised by subsequent litigants. It seems probable that the
Court will again address the subject of statutory subject matter on a case
* Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University. J.D., University of Toledo
College of Law, Order of the Coif; B.A., M.A., Bowling Green State University.
1. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921,
2922–23 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
3. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921.
4. Id. at 2922–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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brought properly before it and will strike the balance that will
encourage innovation but will not extend protection to processes or
business methods that are merely ideas, phenomena of nature, or laws
of nature.
I. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
5
Discoveries.” Pursuant to this power, Congress passed several patent
acts, starting with the Patent Act of 1790, which allowed one who
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine,
or device, or any improvement” not known or used before to petition
6
for a patent. The Patent Act of 1793 allowed an inventor to obtain
letters patent for “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
7
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement.” The
Patent Act of 1836 again protected “any art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” and provided the foundation of the modern
8
9
American system. The Patent Act of 1870 again revised patent law.
Under the current patent law, as originally enacted through the
Patent Act of 1952, an inventor may obtain a patent for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
10
new and useful improvement.” Congress replaced the term “art” from
11
prior acts with “process.”
The Court has interpreted patentable subject matter numerous
times. An illustrative and nonexhaustive discussion of key cases follows.
In 1854, the Supreme Court considered one of Samuel Morse’s
claims regarding his patent on the electromagnetic telegraph in O’Reilly
12
v. Morse. Morse’s eighth claim on the patent for use of the motive
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
6. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (1790) (repealed 1793).
7. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (1793) (repealed 1836).
8. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 117–25 (1836) (amended 1870).
9. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217 (1870) (repealed 1952). Note that
this historical outline includes only major revisions.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Congress intended the statutory subject matter to include
“anything under the sun that is made by man.” S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted
in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
11. Compare Patent Act of 1870, and Patent Act of 1836, and Patent Act of 1793, and
Patent Act of 1790, with 35 U.S.C. § 101.
12. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). The Court stated that “[i]t is
difficult to make a fair report of this case without writing a book. The arguments of counsel
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power of electric current, or electromagnetism, designed for making or
13
printing letters or characters at a distance, was deemed overbroad by
14
Generally, the use of natural phenomena cannot be
the Court.
15
patented.
16
The Court in 1972 in Gottschalk v. Benson held that a method of
computer programming to convert binary-coded-decimal numbers into
pure numbers, which was not limited to any particular art or technology,
was not a patentable process. The Court cited Morse when reaching the
conclusion that a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, may not be
17
patented.
Ideas, phenomena of nature, and algorithms are not
18
19
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technical work.
20
The Court in Parker v. Flook in 1978, citing both Morse and
Gottschalk, held that a method for updating alarm limits during a
catalytic conversion process was not patentable subject matter under 35
21
U.S.C. § 101. The Court stated that this case turned on the proper
22
construction of § 101. The plain language of this section does not
23
answer the question, and the line between a patentable process and an
unpatentable principle is not always clear. The Court concluded that
the patent application contained no claim of a patentable invention, as
the processes involved in catalytic conversion were well-known, and the
application simply provided for new methods of calculating alarm limit
24
values.

would fill a volume by themselves.” Id. at 63.
13. Id. at 112.
14. Id. at 116.
15. Id.
16. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
17. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69–70 (citing Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone
Cases), 126 U.S. 1 (1888)).
18. Id. at 73 (finding that further action by Congress on the patentability of computer
programs was needed).
19. Id. at 67.
20. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (finding that the only novel feature of the
method was an algorithm).
21. Id. at 584.
22. Id. at 590.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2000) (stating that “‘process’ means process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material”).
24. Parker, 437 U.S. at 595. The Court stated that it must proceed cautiously when
extending patent rights into areas wholly unseen by Congress. Id. at 596.
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The Court again construed § 101 in 1980 in Diamond v.
25
Chakrabarty and held that a live, human-made, genetically engineered
bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil was a patentable subject
26
matter. While Congress has the role of defining patentable subject
matter in § 101, the courts must construe Congress’s language. Finding
27
no ambiguity in the statute, the Court found that the language covered
28
Chakrabarty’s invention. This does not mean, however, that § 101 has
no limits or embraces every discovery. Citing Morse, Gottschalk, and
Parker, the Court found that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
29
abstract ideas were not patentable.
Similarly, a new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant discovered in the wild could not
be patented, just as Einstein’s equation and Newton’s law of gravity
30
could not be patented.
The Court interpreted patentable subject matter again in the 1981
31
case of Diamond v. Diehr, holding that a physical and chemical process
of curing synthetic rubber fell within the statutory subject matter
requirements, even though a mathematical equation and computer
32
program were used in several steps of the process. While mathematical
33
formulae and laws of nature are outside the statutory subject matter,
the subject matter for which a patent was sought in Diehr was defined as
34
a process. Citing Chakrabarty, which had been decided in the prior
Term, the Court examined the statute and reached the conclusion that
such industrial processes have historically been eligible for patent
35
protection.
Against this backdrop of Supreme Court statutory jurisprudence, the
36
dissent in the Supreme Court’s dismissal of LabCorp reached its
conclusion.
25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
26. Id. at 305 (stating that no naturally occurring bacteria had this property).
27. Id. at 315.
28. Id. at 318. Congress could amend § 101 to exclude organisms produced by genetic
engineering or draft a statute specifically covering them, but until it does, the Court interprets
the existing statute to include such things as patentable subject matter. Id.
29. Id. at 309.
30. Id.
31. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
32. Id. at 184.
33. Id. at 185 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)).
34. Id. at 184–85.
35. Id. at 184.
36. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921,
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II. LABCORP
In the 1980s, three university doctors conducted medical research on
vitamin deficiencies and discovered a correlation between high blood
levels of homocysteine and deficiencies of folate (folic acid) and
37
cobalamin (vitamin B12). The researchers developed more accurate
homocysteine tests using a gas chromatography and mass spectrometry
38
method; they then published their findings and applied for a patent.
Patent number 4,970,658 (the ’658 Patent) was issued to the
inventors in 1990 for a method for determining total homocysteine
levels, including methods for detecting cobalamin and folic acid
deficiencies using an assay for total homocysteine levels and methods
for distinguishing cobalamin deficiency from folic acid deficiency using
an assay for total homocysteine levels in conjunction with an assay for
39
methylmalonic acid. The claim at issue was claim number thirteen,
which contained a method for detecting a cobalamin or folate deficiency
using the steps of “assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total
homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in
40
said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.”
The inventors’ universities assigned the ’658 Patent to University
41
Patents, Inc., which later became Competitive Technologies, Inc.
Competitive Technologies then granted a license of the ’658 Patent to
42
Metabolite Laboratories. Metabolite sublicensed the patent to Roche
43
Biomedical Laboratories, which is now LabCorp. In 1998, LabCorp
2922–29 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 2923.
38. Id.
39. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10, 1990). Accurate and
early diagnosis of these deficiencies is important because these deficiencies can lead to lifethreatening hematologic abnormalities that are completely reversible with cobalamin or
folate. Id. col.1 ll.32–44.
40. Id. col.41 ll.61–65. The original claim number thirteen for a ‘“method for detecting
a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals by assaying body fluid for the
presence of elevated levels of total homocysteine’” was rejected by the examiner. Brief for
Respondents at 5, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607). The inventors then added the
discrete, sequential “correlating” step. Id. at 6.
41. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006); Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6.
Competitive Technologies licenses the technological developments of colleges and
universities to industry. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6.
42. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 6. The University of Colorado had
established Metabolite Laboratories to practice the invention and spark industry interest. Id.
43. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359. LabCorp was to pay Competitive Technologies a six
percent royalty for the patent sublicense and additionally to pay Metabolite Laboratories a
separate 21.5% royalty for the know-how license on homocysteine assays. Brief for
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switched to a total homocysteine assay developed by Abbott
44
Laboratories and stopped paying royalties to Metabolite Laboratories.
Competitive Technologies sued LabCorp for patent infringement,
inducing infringement, and contributory infringement; Metabolite
45
Laboratories sued LabCorp for breach of the license agreement. The
46
district court held a Markman hearing to construe terms of the patent
claims. The term “correlating” in claim thirteen was construed to be
47
one of several ‘“discrete, sequential process steps.’” “Correlating,”
according to the court, is a verb that means more than a simple
existence of a relationship between a high level of homocysteine and
deficiency in cobalamin or folate, and instead it indicates the
48
establishment of a mutual or reciprocal relationship.
A jury found that LabCorp breached its license agreement with
Metabolite Laboratories, that LabCorp willfully infringed the ’658
49
Patent, and that the claims were not invalid. The jury determined
damages of over $3,650,000 for breach of contract and over $1,000,000
50
for patent infringement. The district court doubled the infringement
damages for willfulness and permanently enjoined LabCorp from using
51
52
the Abbott test. LabCorp appealed.

Respondents, supra note 40, at 7 n.4.
44. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.
45. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 8.
46. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that
“construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the
province of the court”). See generally Sue Ann Mota, Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc.: Patent Construction Is Within the Exclusive Province of the Court Under the Seventh
Amendment, 3 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997).
47. Joint Appendix, Volume I at 60, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607).
48. Id.
49. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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53

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. On appeal,
the court first reviewed the district court’s claim construction. The
claim language, itself, governs, using the understanding of those with
54
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
The court
affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the correlation step in
55
claim thirteen. Similarly, the appeals court found substantial evidence
56
to support the jury’s verdict on infringement. LabCorp also argued on
appeal that claim thirteen was invalid, but the appeals court rejected this
57
The appeals court also affirmed the jury’s finding that
as well.
58
LabCorp breached the license agreement.
LabCorp did not challenge the jury’s willfulness finding, but rather,
appealed contending that the district court did not discuss the factors for
59
enhanced damages. While the Federal Circuit has a strong preference
53. Id. at 1372. See generally Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence
Posts: Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 623, 666 n.194 (2005); Steven C. Cherny et al., 2004 Patent Law Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 1117–18 (2005); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent
Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 49, 61 n.30 (2005); John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of
Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 781, 807 (2005);
Jessica L. Kaiser, Note & Comment, What’s That Mean? A Proposed Claim Construction
Methodology for Phillips v. AWH Corp., 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1011 n.12 (2005).
54. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1362. In most cases, the best source for determining the
context is the specification. The specification confirms that the claim language does not
require as part of the method that the elevated level causes some bad symptoms. Id.
55. Id. at 1364.
56. Id. The jury found LabCorp liable for indirect infringement, which requires a
finding of direct infringement to support it. Id. Physicians directly infringed by ordering the
assays and carrying out the correlating step after receiving the results from LabCorp. Id. The
appeals court affirmed the finding of LabCorp’s indirect infringement and did not consider
contributory infringement. Id. at 1364–65.
57. Id. at 1368. LabCorp argued that claim thirteen was invalid on the grounds of
indefiniteness, lack of a written description and enablement, anticipation, and obviousness.
Id. at 1365. Concerning the argument that the correlating step in claim thirteen was
indefinite, the appeals court cited 35 U.S.C. § 112 and stated that it was not indefinite. Id. at
1366. Under § 112, there is both the written description and enablement for sufficiency of the
specification. Id. Claim thirteen is not obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Id. at 1368. The prior
art also did not anticipate claim thirteen under 35 U.S.C. § 102, according to the appeals
court. Id. at 1367.
LabCorp also raised the same issues concerning claim eighteen, but the court of appeals
vacated the district court’s advisory opinion on that claim due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 1368–69.
58. Id. at 1369–70. The contract interpretation was governed by state law. Id. at 1369.
59. Id. at 1370; see Read v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (listing
factors for enhanced damages). The factors to be weighed for enhancing damages include:
whether the infringer deliberately copied another’s ideas or design; whether the infringer
knew of the patent holder’s patent protection, investigated the issue, and had a good-faith
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for the district court to set forth its rationale, its failure to do so is at
60
Finally, while LabCorp argued that the
most harmless error.
injunction was overbroad, the injunction simply addressed LabCorp’s
61
specific acts, according to the appeals court. Thus, the district court’s
62
decision was affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider the third
question in the petition:
Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite,
undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to
“correlat[e]” test results can validly claim a monopoly over a
basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking
63
about the relationship after looking at a test result.
On June 22, 2006, the writ of certiorari was dismissed by the Court
64
as improvidently granted. The petitioner, LabCorp, argued in its brief
to the Court that the answer to the question for which certiorari was
65
granted was “no.” Citing Morse, LabCorp argued that claim thirteen
involved no inventive process or device beyond the natural
66
phenomenon it recited.
The respondents, Metabolite Laboratories and Competitive
Technologies, argued in their brief to the Court that LabCorp’s
contention that claim thirteen recited only natural phenomena was not
pleaded in LabCorp’s answer, tried in or decided by the district court,
raised in or addressed by the court of appeals, presented in the
belief that the patent was invalid or not infringed; the infringer’s behavior as a party to the
litigation; the infringer’s size and financial condition; the closeness of the case; the duration of
the infringer’s misconduct; the infringer’s motivation for harm; and whether the defendant
attempted to conceal his or her misconduct. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
60. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1371.
61. Id. at 1372.
62. Id. With respect to the court’s decision, Circuit Judge Schall dissented only
regarding the interpretation of claim thirteen. Id. at 1372 (Schall, J., dissenting). He believed
the majority improperly expanded the scope of claim thirteen and would have remanded for
the recalculation of damages. Id. at 1372–74.
63. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings (LabCorp) v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607). See generally Helen M. Beeman
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics,
and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 889 n.76 (2006); John A. Squires & Thomas
S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean that the
USPTO Is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561, 586
(2006).
64. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921.
65. Brief for Petitioner at 2, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607).
66. Id. at 18.
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67

certiorari petition, nor included in the grant of certiorari. According to
Metabolite Laboratories, “it is unlikely that there has ever been another
case in the annals of this Court in which a party so clearly embraced
68
every avenue for forfeiting a right in every court along the way.”
These contentions were also raised at oral argument before the
Court, and the reasons for dismissing the case became clear by the
69
questions raised by the Justices.
Justice Kennedy asked counsel
arguing for the petitioner to find something in the opinion of the U.S.
70
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that was wrong.
Justice
Kennedy did not receive a specific reply to the question. Arguing for
the respondents, Miguel Estrada stated that the judgment should be
affirmed because LabCorp never asked the trial judge or the Federal
71
Circuit to declare the patent claim invalid under § 101. The Deputy
Solicitor General, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner LabCorp,
ironically argued that parties should be held responsible for procedural
72
errors.
If the § 101 issue had been addressed by the Court, then
defendants would have held this defense for a second trip to court as a
way to tire the inventor and start over. According to LabCorp’s amicus,
73
“[t]hat’s no way to run a legal system.”
In June 2006, the Court agreed with Metabolite Laboratories and
74
dismissed the case.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and
75
Souter, dissented. The writ should not have been dismissed, according
to the dissenters, because the Court had authority to decide it, the Court
said that it would decide it, the parties and amici briefed it, the question
was not difficult, and the medical field and patients would have
76
benefited from a decision.

67. Brief for Respondents, supra note 40, at 10–11.
68. Id. The respondents further argued that if the Court did consider the § 101 issue,
then claim thirteen was “drawn to statutory subject matter.” Id. at 12.
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 18, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607).
70. Id. at 8–10. When asked by Justice Stevens why § 101 was not quoted, LabCorp’s
counsel responded that the Court, itself, never cited § 101 in such cases until 1972. Id. at 49–
50.
71. Id. at 30. Further, Estrada contended that “you’re being asked to tell [sic] trial court
and three courts of appeals judges that they committed reversible error for failing to address
a question that nobody ever asked them.” Id. at 32.
72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04607).
73. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 46.
74. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921.
75. Id. at 2922–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2921.
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The dissent to the dismissal of the writ acknowledged a technical
77
78
procedural reason as well as a practical reason for not answering the
question for which the writ of certiorari was granted. The dissent,
however, found stronger reasons for reaching a decision in the case.
The dissent believed the procedural objection was tenuous because
LabCorp argued the essence of the claim, and there was no practical
79
reason for refusing to decide the case. It was in the public interest,
80
according to the dissent, to clarify the law sooner rather than later.
Despite the fact that the case was dismissed, the dissent turned to
the merits. Citing Morse, Flook, Chakrabarty, and Diehr, the dissent
stated that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, such
as a mathematical formula or the motive power of electromagnetism,
81
may not be patented. Although non-patentable phenomena of nature
82
are difficult to define, according to the dissent, the correlation between

77. Id. at 2925 (finding that LabCorp did not refer to § 101 in the lower courts).
78. Id. (suggesting that there is a “benefit” to be derived from the views of the Federal
Circuit, which did not consider the issue).
79. Id. at 2925–26. “Of course, further consideration by the Federal Circuit might help
us reach a better decision . . . [but] the thoroughness of the briefing leads me to conclude that
the extra time, cost, and uncertainty that further proceedings would engender are not worth
the potential benefit.” Id. at 2926.
80. Id. at 2926.
81. Id. at 2922.
82. Id. at 2926–27 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3 (2003)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/203/10/innovationrpt.pdf). This
study was also cited in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
which was decided the same Term. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The FTC Report examines the proper balance of competition and patent laws; chapter three
examines current innovation in selected industries. FTC REPORT, supra. Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in eBay, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens, cited the FTC Report
concerning patent non-practicing entities, which obtain and enforce patents but either have
no product or do not create or sell a product vulnerable to infringement countersuit. eBay,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FTC REPORT, supra). See generally Sue Ann
Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: Traditional Focu-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies to
Patent Cases, According to the Supreme Court, AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). The nonpracticing entities referred to in the FTC Report have also been called “patent trolls,” a term
coined by Intel’s former patent chief Peter Detkin. Nicholas Varchaver, Who’s Afraid of
Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 110.
Justice Breyer cited the FTC Report on the need for strong patent protection in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries to spur innovation. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2926
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing FTC REPORT, supra). Justice Breyer also cited a law review
article on the issue of the industry-specified nature of innovation. Id. at 2926–27 (citing Dan
L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577–89
(2003)).
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homocysteine and vitamin deficiency constituted a natural
83
phenomenon.
The dissent to the dismissal of the writ further stated that even if the
dissent was wrong on the merits, there would still have been value in
84
deciding the case to avoid uncertainty in the future and to contribute to
the ongoing discussion of whether patent laws keep the necessary
85
careful balance between overprotection and underprotection.
CONCLUSION
86

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ in LabCorp in June 2006 as
improvidently granted, but the issue of patentable subject matter is not
going away. The Court, in this author’s opinion, properly refused to
decide an issue not argued or decided below and for which LabCorp
could not point to reversible error in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
87
Federal Circuit. Anxious to get to the merits, the dissent from the
dismissal would have decided the case despite what the dissent
88
acknowledged to be a “tenuous” procedural roadblock. On the merits,
89
the three dissenters would have found claim thirteen invalid.

83. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Claim thirteen’s process is
merely for the user to obtain test results and think about them. Id. Neither the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), nor the Federal Circuit’s
decision in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), help the respondents according to the dissent. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2927–28
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent further states that the statement in State Street Bank that
a process is patentable if it produces a useful, tangible, concrete result, State St. Bank, 149
F.3d at 1373, has never been stated by the Court. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2927–28 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
84. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2929 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2922. The dissent cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, which all of
the dissenters to this dismissal joined. Id. at 2929 (citing eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842). The
dissent in LabCorp also cited Robert Pitofsky, Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New
Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2001) (stating that competition policies need to
adjust to the new economy and intellectual property policy must also be revisited), and Malla
Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense,
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 61 (2002) (concluding that there are four arguments for the unconstitutionality of
business method patents).
86. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2921.
87. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 65, at 13.
88. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 69, at 8–10. This author agrees with the
Deputy Solicitor General that such a ruling would result in legal counsel holding arguments
in reserve to raise later and that is not how the legal system should be run.
89. LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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This outcome leaves LabCorp liable for the damages for
90
infringement and breach of contract, although three members of the
Court were willing to aid LabCorp. It seems probable that in a future
case, parties will properly plead, argue, and, if necessary, appeal the
issue of statutory subject matter under § 101. If the Court grants
certiorari on the issue, Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter have
91
indicated in LabCorp their concern with the statutory subject matter,
and they provided the foundation for a future decision. Justice
Kennedy, who was joined by those Justices in a concurrence in another
92
patent case in the same Term, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., also
patiently awaits the issue to appear properly before the Court. If these
four can get at least one more member of the Court to agree, the Court
will address the subject matter issue and restore the proper balance of
93
patent protection to ensure the continued incentive to innovate.
Business methods and processes that are mere ideas or phenomena of
94
nature will likely be addressed by this Court, which may draw the line
of statutory subject matter more closely around § 101.

90. See id. at 2921 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 2921–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
93. See LabCorp, 126 S. Ct. at 2922–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. The Court may also carefully address non-practicing entities as well. Based on his
concurrence in eBay, Justice Kennedy seems poised to tackle the technological issues in the
new economy. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

